I want to thank Eli and Paul for reading my post, and for taking the time to share their thoughts about it. Most online discussions of this stuff are civil and productive, and this is no exception. I also want to thank them for giving me the opportunity to respond to what they wrote.

I would never claim that replicability is the only issue we should consider when judging the quality of research, and when thinking about which kinds of policies our science should adopt. As an AE I have rejected papers because there were signs that the key findings would not replicate, but I have also rejected papers because they were not novel or interesting enough, or because the studies were confounded. What I said in my post is that we should *prioritize* replicability. This was a carefully chosen word. If you try to prioritize a bunch of things at once, well, you really aren't *prioritizing* anything at all. For example, it makes no sense to say that we should prioritize home life *and* work life *and* sleep life. All three are important, but I choose to *prioritize* sleep life. My simple point is this: Replicability should be the *priority*, the *first* thing that matters, the most necessary of things. Even though it's quite obviously not the only thing.

I sometimes realize too late that the study I just ran had a really dumb confound, something that makes the results meaningless or trivial. In such cases, I don't expend the useless effort to chase down whether that dumb study replicates. This is not because I am prioritizing non-dumbness over replicability; it's because I also value non-dumbness. To understand where Eli/Paul and I actually disagree, you need to force a tradeoff between non-dumbness and replicability. And my position is this: The field would be *much* better off if I published a dumb replicable study than a smart non-replicable one, because readers can spot the dumbness but they cannot (usually or definitively) spot the falseness.

False-positive errors are hard to see and to correct. They can do serious harm to researchers and to consumers. They can slow or reverse scientific progress, diverting resources away from true ideas and toward false ideas. And they can do this for *a very long time.* Other errors are not nearly as consequential. Trained readers can *see* whether a study is merely correlational or whether it is confounded, or trivial, or lacking in construct validity or ecological validity. And when they see it, they can make the appropriate inferences and do research to try to correct it. Uri Simonsohn discovered a confound in much of the implicit-egotism/name-letter-effects literature because he could *see* the potential confound when he read the methods sections of those papers. Consequently, he was able to correct many papers-worth of mistakes in one or two fell swoops. But Uri was unable to correct my and Leif's *false-positive* name-letter-effects finding because our error was not visible or easily correctable. Attempting to correct visible errors or shortcomings is a natural part of the scientific process. Not knowing whether a published finding is true or false is a hindrance to the scientific process.

This leads to my final point: Prioritizing replicability does not mean that you must prioritize *replication attempts*. To illustrate, imagine two worlds: Now World and Before I Die World. In Now World, we don't prioritize replicability. As a consequence, our literature is riddled (or at least spotted) with findings that are false. So some of the literature is true and some of it is false, and we can't easily (or at all) tell the difference. In Now World, the only way to tell the difference is to conduct replications of published work. And so, somewhat ironically, failing to prioritize replicability means that we now need to conduct lots of replications, because that's the only surefire way to identify what's true and what's false.

In Before I Die World, we prioritize replicability. And we don't necessarily do that by trying to replicate every study we run; we could also/instead do it by making sure that we don't p-hack (by pre-registering) and by properly powering our studies and by triple-checking our analyses to make sure there are no errors. In this world, we can actually trust that the findings that populate our literatures are replicable. Thus, when we seek to build on those findings, or to show that they are wrongly interpreted, we don't have to replicate them first, because we already know they'll replicate. Prioritizing replicability makes replications less necessary.

Having spent considerable time in Now World, I have decided to move to Before I Die World. I hope Eli and Paul will move there with me.