Seminars / Conferences
|May 18, 2010||Consortium for Operational Excellence in Retailing (COER) Conference (May 18-19, 2010)|
|November 13, 2009||Workshop for Empirical Research in Operations Management|
|November 12, 2009||Workshop for Empirical Research in Operations Management|
|May 20, 2008||Consortium for Operational Excellence in Retailing (COER) Conference (May 20-21, 2008)|
|September 27, 2007||Workshop on Empirical Research in Operations Management (Sept. 27-28, 2007)|
|May 8, 2007||Third Workshop on Sponsored Search Auctions (Banff, Canada)|
|February 9, 2007||Service Supply Chain Thought Leaders Forum|
|February 8, 2007||Service Supply Chain Thought Leaders Forum|
|September 18, 2006||Seeds of Disaster|
|September 17, 2012||Kaitlin Daniels||
Demand Response in Energy Markets
In response to the disconnect between energy consumption and supply, demand response programs have arisen to provide energy consumers a mechanism by which to respond to market prices. Among these programs are load curtailment contracts, which allow forgone energy consumption to be sold on the market during peak demand events. The existing literature in this area focuses on involuntary curtailment contracts, under which consumers relinquish control of their energy consumption in return for payment. This paper expands the scope of this literature to include voluntary curtailment contracts, which allow consumers to decide whether to reduce their load during each peak event. We solve for the optimal voluntary contract and demonstrate under which regimes the voluntary contract outperforms the involuntary alternative. We find that the voluntary contract is robust to large spreads in load reduction cost (the opportunity cost of reducing consumption experienced by the consumer) and high market demand. We conclude that the voluntary contract is more appropriate when targeting a large pool of commercial and industrial consumers.
|September 11, 2012||Jing Peng||
Dynamics of Social Advertising
Social advertising, which uses the endorsement of friends as a way to establish trust, is becoming a more and more favorable approach to advertising in recent years. While there have been a number of studies investigating how content diffuse over social network, little has been done on how ads, which have very different nature with content, spread over social network in the literature. In addition, while a common practice in social advertising is to price an endorser based on her number of followers, it is still unclear how the marginal and overall influence of a user change with her network size. The typical implicit assumption that networks on different scales are homogenous in social influence makes little sense. Furthermore, most previous research on social influence takes it for granted that influential users are the most value users to target at, yet no comprehensive empirical study has been done to test whether influential users are necessarily the most cost‐efficient to target at in the social network. Using a dataset pertaining to the diffusion of ads on social network, this paper aims at studying how users with different scales network varies in their marginal and overall effects to influence and susceptibility and in their long term and short term effects to the dynamics of ads diffusion. Moreover, this paper evaluates the cost‐efficiency of targeting at users with different characteristics under different cost assumptions.
|September 11, 2012||Alice Xingwei Lu||
Fashion Consumers, Delayed Techonolgy Introduction and Rationing
This paper studies monopoly production, pricing and technology releasing of overlapping generations of a durable good. We consider a group of fashion consumers who derive an extra utility from buying the latest version of the good at its release period. The existence of fashion consumers benefits the firm through two mechanisms: i) the extra fashion utility the firm can extract; ii) the potential opportunity for the firm to induce multiple purchases. It is shown that in order to induce multiple purchases, the firm may want to withhold its technology in the early versions and lower the price in later versions. Sub‐game perfect equilibria are derived in different scenarios, and conditions are given under which the firm wants to induce multiple purchases and withhold its latest technologies. Counter to intuition, it is the market followers rather than the earlier adopters who benefit from fashion utility. An extension of the model studies the firm's quantity decisions when consumers' fashion utility decreases in availability. Different extents of rationing are valuable to the firm under this assumption.
|May 11, 2012||Andrés Catalán||
Strategic optimization of split orders at Yihaodian
In e-commerce it is often the case that the retailer has to fulfill an order from more than one distribution center. This kind of situation is called a split order. Our goal is to minimize the number of split orders by allocating SKUs to DCs. The problem can be characterized as a two-stage stochastic integer program with recourse. At the stage of the study, we will compare the performance of several heuristics against a dataset from an important Chinese online retailer. Time permitting, we will also cover the dataset and potential directions for further research.
|April 6, 2012||Mehmet Fazil Paç||Adoption of Technological Innovation in Competitive Network Markets We compare two approaches widely used for procuring innovation from external sources: open innovation tournaments and request for proposals (RFP). Under both approaches, a firm procuring innovation (seeker) awards a fixed, pre-announced amount to a single winner of a procurement contest selected among multiple contest participants (solvers). In an innovation tournament all competing solvers incur development costs and deliver finished products to the seeker, whereas in an RFP only the solver with the winning bid incurs development costs and delivers a product. Our analysis shows that high potential variation in the quality of delivered products and large solver pools both favor tournaments, while high return-on-effort and high variation in solver ability favors RFPs.|
|March 23, 2012||Alison W. Brooks||I am excited! Shifting pre-performance arousal from anxiety to excitement (may help you become the next American Idol) Anxiety is pervasive in the workplace (Pilot Study A). People believe the best way to cope with anxiety is to try to “calm down” (Pilot Study B). However, across seven lab studies and one archival field study, I find that conventional wisdom is wrong. In the face of anxiety-inducing tasks, trying to “calm down” does not decrease physiological arousal (Study 1). Instead of trying to calm down, it is easy to appraise high arousal as excitement instead of anxiety (Study 2). One way that individuals shift their experiences of anxiety and excitement is by making a minimal statement (e.g., saying “I am excited”), which influences the subjective experience of emotion (Study 3) and subsequent performance. Compared to stating “I am anxious” or nothing, stating “I am excited” improved performance in an anxiety-inducing domain: karaoke singing (Study 4). This result holds in an archival field study of the popular television show, “American Idol” (Study 5).|
|December 2, 2011||Alessandro Arlotto||Markov Decision Problems where Means bound Variances We consider a rich class of finite-horizon Markov decision problems (MDPs) that have a natural dynamic self-bounding property, and we show that for such problems the variance of the optimal total reward can be bounded in terms of its expected value. This provides an easily used measure of the uncertainty of the realized reward, and it leads to a weak law of large numbers for the realized reward. The applicability of this bound and some simple criteria for an MDP to be self-bounding are illustrated by examples of self-bounding MDPs from classical problems in operations research, operations management, financial engineering, and combinatorial optimization. Joint work with Noah Gans and J. Michael Steele (Wharton).|
|November 11, 2011||
INFORMS Talks (Special Time 10am-1pm)
10:00am: Bob Batt
|November 4, 2011||
INFORMS Talks (Special Time 10am-12:30pm)
10am: Hessam Bavafa
|October 21, 2011||Vibhanshu Abhishek||Reselling or Platform-Selling? Channel Structures in Electronic Retailing "Recent innovations in e-commerce have led to the emergence of e-commerce platforms, which manufacturers can use to directly reach out to customers. In this paper we analyze under what market conditions e-tailers should set up e-commerce platforms instead of entering into a more conventional reseller agreement with manufacturers. We use a theoretical model to capture the effect that various factors like market competition and interaction with traditional channel have on this decision. Our results suggest that whenever the e-channel leads to cannibalization in traditional retail, setting up a platform is more profitable for the e-tailers, whereas, when the electronic channel leads to strong stimulation of demand in the traditional channel, e-tailers should enter into a reseller contract with the manufacturer. This change in preference is moderated by competition and as the competition increases, the e-tailers prefer to set up platforms. We also identify conditions under which all markets participants are better off when platforms are used. Finally, we analyze the effect that a new entrant has on existing e-channel structure and show that entry can disrupt existing channel structures. Surprisingly, we find that under some conditions consumers might face higher prices in the electronic channel when there are competing e-tailers as opposed to a monopolistic e-tailer. Joint work with Kinshuk Jerath (CMU) and Z. John Zhang (Wharton)."|